Introduction
Economic growth in diversied economies is inherently unbalanced, because sectors have dierent factor intensities and factor endowments grow at diering rates. In the developing world, where capital endowments are typically highly concentrated by location, any new investments, price or * Funding for this research comes from the Ford Foundation Oce for Vietnam and Thailand. We are grateful to Paul Glewwe and to participants in the University of Wisconsin Development Workshop for helpful comments on an earlier draft. † dnphan@wisc.edu ‡ coxhead@wisc.edu productivity shocks, or policy interventions that alter the value marginal products of factor inputs at a sectoral level thus induce a spatial reallocation of the relatively mobile factor, labor. In this way, economic growth and internal migration are complements: growth stimulates migration, and migration facilitates growth.
The growth-migration relationship is a source of many empirical questions with normative and policy implications. In this paper we address two such questions, using data on interprovincial migration from a rapidly-growing low-income economy, Vietnam. First, we inquire into the determinants of inter-provincial migration during an era of rapid growth, testing the extent to which labor ows between provinces can be explained by distance, income of sending and receiving provinces, and past migration. These variables have been found to be signicant in other studies, but equally important, an investigation of this type can also yield information about impediments to migration. This is important to our second inquiry, into the links between migration and inter-provincial income inequality.
Since the 1986 adoption of the economic reform package known as doi moi, Vietnam's economy has experienced rapid growth, averaging 7% per year, accompanied by impressive poverty 1 As a result, labor market adjustments and migration have become vital in spreading the benets of growth from urban centers to hinterland areas.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Despite the apparent importance of the topic, the literature on labor mobility and migration in Vietnam only started to receive attention very recently. Earlier studies (Guest 1998 and poverty and inequality. These studies generally indicate that internal migration benets not only migrants but also their families and source communities, and that internal migration tends to be pro-poor although it might increase inequality within the origin.
Our paper's contribution to the literature is twofold. First, while we employ the popular empirical gravity model, which hypothesizes that the ow of migrants between locations is a 1 In 2002, the four provinces in the HCMC cluster made up 50 percent of the country's industrial output (HCMC alone accounted for 22 percent), while the northern cluster made up 14 percent. According to Mekong Economics (2002), the key areas in the South attract as much as 60 percent of all licensed foreign direct investment projects, and 53 percent of total registered capital. function of population, distance, wage/income dierentials, dierences in unemployment rate, and other variables (Greenwood 1997 , Fan 2005 , Dhar 1984 , Adrienko and Guriev 2004, Mueser 1989 ), we construct a theoretical framework that gives the model a solid structural interpretation.
Furthermore, the framework incorporates a subsistence constraint and thus yields hypotheses regarding the impact of a sending province's income on migration. This allows us to examine the implications of liquidity constraints on poverty-related labor immobility.
The second contribution is to unravel the link between internal migration and regional income inequality. The empirical literature typically addresses this question with a standard convergence/growth regression, but this approach has also been subjected to methodological and empirical critiques (see section 4). We examine the migration-inequality relationship using a simple yet novel approach: we relate the impact of the outmigration rate from province i to province j in one period to the change in income dierential between the two provinces in the next period.
This second contribution also relates to the existing literature on Vietnam's migration and spatial inequality. Increasing regional inequality is becoming a concern in Vietnam, as evidenced by a steady increase in the standard deviation of per capita GDP across provinces (see gure 2). To study the impact of migration on regional or provincial inequality, micro data sets with national coverage are needed. Yet there is a serious lack of such data sets, making it dicult, if not impossible, to relate macroeconomic changes at the regional and sectoral levels with economic decision-making and welfare changes at the micro level. For an empirical study, then, there is a trade-o between national-level coverage at the provincial level and much more limited coverage at the level of the household. Most of the Vietnam migration studies cited above forgo the former, and hence cannot draw economy-wide inferences on migration issues. Our study uses aggregate data on interprovincial migration. The limitations of this data set for the purpose of obtaining insights into household-level migration decisions and outcomes are obvious. Unlike household level data, however, it does yield economy-wide inferences on migration. In this way our approach is complementary to the more usual household level analysis.
[ Figure 2 about here] Our econometric analysis robustly conrms economic motives for migration, but also suggests the existence of poverty-related labor immobility at the provincial level. This in turn may imply persistence of poverty in certain regions if labor mobility is indeed a major channel through which the benets of growth are distributed. We nd that the impact of migration on income dierentials between pairs of provinces can be positive, negative or zero, depending on the destination.
A particularly interesting result is the robust and negative impact on income dierentials of migration ows going to HCMC and surrounding provinces, where most of Vietnam'slabor-intensive manufacturing growth and investments are concentrated. This lends support to the importance of the labor market and migration in distributing the benets of trade-driven manufacturing growth.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework for the migration decision of a representative household, and links migration with inter-provincial income inequality. Section 3 investigates determinants of inter-provincial migration ows, and tests the hypothesis that poorer people/provinces have low migration propensity because of their inability to nance migration costs. Section 4 examines the relationship between migration and inter-provincial income dierentials. Section 5 oers concluding thoughts and directions for future research.
2
Theoretical Framework 2.1 Literature review Lucas (1997) provides an excellent review of the literature on inter-provincial migration in developing countries. There are two main theoretical approaches on inter-regional migration, the disequilibrium approach and the equilibrium approach (Greenwood 1997) . Each is built around a core model of wage/income dierences in origin and destination as predictors of migration ows, but each provides a dierent interpretation of key variablesnotably of income in the origin. The disequilibrium approach is formulated in the context of individual utility maximization.
Migration is driven by the existence of a set of non-market clearing regional wages or incomes.
Dierences in wages/incomes, which are caused by exogenous shocks, reect opportunities for utility gains through migration. Hence migration acts as an equilibrating force in bringing the wage/income dierential back to zero, and is independent of location-specic amenities. This framework provides the rationale for including variables on income, earning, wage, unemployment rate, degree of urbanization, etc. in equations estimating the determinants of migration ows, as most studies indeed do. Some models also include demographic and education variables of the origin, such as median age or median number of years of schooling, to proxy for the average characteristics of the population from which the migrants are drawn. This approach predicts that wage/income variable in the origin should take a negative sign, while the destination wage/income variable should take a positive sign. According to Greenwood (1997) and Greenwood (1969) .
The equilibrium approach is also formulated in the context of individual utility maximization, and also assumes that migration is motivated by spatial variations. But it diers from the former approach in the source and persistence of these variations (Greenwood 1997 ). This approach assumes that the system is already in equilibrium even with the existence of wage/income dierential, because these dierentials simply reect the dierences in location-specic amenities (both social and natural). Both migration and changes in wages act as the equilibrating forces in response to exogenous changes in amenity demand. Using this framework, proponents of the equilibrium hypothesis include a wide variety of regional amenities in their econometric speci- 
Basic model -motivations for migration
Consider a pair of provinces, denoted s and r. Assume that in the initial period t=0, province r (the receiving province) is richer, or has higher per capita income Y r,0 than per capita income Y s,0 of province s (the sending province). At the end of t = 0, a representative household in province s must decide whether or not to allocate some labor to migration in order to maximize its expected income in period t = 1:
sr is the assumed structure of the migration cost function, m sr,0 is the past migration rate, and D sr is the geographical distance between the provinces. Total labor supply of this representative household is normalized to one, so m sr,1 is also the out-migration rate from s to r.
It is assumed in this model that σ > 1, θ < 0, and γ > 0. σ > 1 implies that the migration cost is convex in migrant labor supply; that is, migration costs increase at an increasing rate as the number of migrants increases. This assumption is widely used in the regional economics literature (Yang 2004) . Convexity can arise from sources such as increasing urban rents or increasing unwillingness to migrate for remaining family members (who tend to be older and more attached to the home area than the rst migrants). As we will see shortly, this assumption on the value of σ is important, because it may determine the relationship between migration rate and sending province's per capita income. The literature recognizes past migration rates and geographical distance between provinces as important determinants of migration costs. In particular, distance serves as a proxy for the cost of transportation, cost of job search and information acquisition, as well as the psychological cost of migration. Greater distance should increase these costs and hence deter migration, i.e., γ > 0. The past migration rate, on the other hand, measures the stock of existing migrants and proxies for a migration network, which can signicantly reduce these costs and thus encourage migration, i.e., θ < 0.
The rst-order condition of the migration function yields the optimal migration rate:
Taking logs on both sides, we get:
where
are the elasticities of migration rate with respect to income dierential, distance, and past migration rate, respectively. Equation (2) has the form of a typical modied gravity migration equation, in which the migration rate is a function of the income dierential, distance, and past migration (Greenwood 1997 , Fan 2005 , Dhar 1984 , Andrienko 2004 , Mueser 1989 ).
Liquidity constraint and non-linearity in migration decisions
As mentioned earlier, most empirical work in the migration literature nds a negative impact of origin income on migration. However, a few studies, either using micro or macro data, nd a positive eect in some income ranges, suggesting a non-linear relationship between origin income and migration propensity (Connell et al. 1976 In reconciling this dierence, Banerjee and Kanbur (1981) were among the rst to incorporate migration costs to investigate specically the role of origin's income in the migration process.
Their model is based on the idea that when migration is costly and when the capital market operates imperfectly, increased income would raise the capacity to nance migration. In what follows, we use a similar idea but model the migration cost function explicitly; the resulting formulation exhibits a non-linear relationship between migration and income in the origin.
Suppose the household faces a subsistence constraint S, such that any savings from period 0's income to nance migration at the start of period 1 must satisfy the constraint Y s,0 − C ≥ S.
By assumption, there is no borrowing due to capital market imperfections. For simplicity, and without changing key results, we drop past migration rate and distance from the migration cost function. Several subscripts are also dropped for notational ease. The household's optimization problem becomes:
The rst-order condition yields:
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. If the subsistence constraint binds ( λ > 0), then the optimal migration rate, using the subsistence constraint at equality, is m * = 3 This is the level of income above which the household is no longer bound by the subsistence constraint. So we have:
Thus, the marginal impact of the sending province's per capita income on the out-migration rate 2 Note that when c > 1, the objective function is globally concave, and the solution is as presented in the paper. When c = 1, we clearly have a corner solution: the household compares the expected income from not migrating at all to that from sending all labor away, and choose the option that yields higher income. When c > 1, the objective function is globally convex, so no global minimum exists. However, since the choice variable m is constrained to be in the interval [ on migration is negative (provided σ > 1 as assumed here), as suggested by the push eect hypothesis, which maintains that poorer people want to migrate more. This result suggests that a labor mobility trap is possible, at least theoretically, as long as the migration cost is suciently high and the capital market is imperfect.
Migration and income inequality
Let us go back to the notation in section 2.2. Following Yang (2004), the realized net income gain from migration in period 1 for the whole household is:
Substituting (1) into (4) yields:
as the relative per capita income inequality between s and r in period t = 0. For simplicity, assume that Y r,0 and Y s,0 are exogenously given and that they are the same as per capita GDP, i.e., there is no remittance ow between the two provinces in the initial period. Let g r (m sr , Z r ) and g s (m sr , Z s ) be the gross growth rates 4 in per capita GDP from t = 0 to t = 1 of the two provinces. Z r and Z s are (exogenously given) province-specic characteristics that determine its long-run per capita GDP growth rate. Let τ be the measure of the propensity to remit. The relative income inequality between s and r in period t = 1 is then: 5
The expression shows that the current-period income dierential is a function of initial per capita incomes, migration, and all the province-specic variables that determine the growth rates of per 4 Dened as g = 1 + r, where r is the net growth rate 5 It is implicitly assumed that migrants are accounted as one separate group, so the dened relative income inequality only measures the income dierential between natives of province r and stayers of province s.
capita GDP in the two provinces. This theoretical relationship forms the foundation for our empirical analysis of the impact of migration on inter-provincial income dierences in section 4 3 Determinants of inter-provincial migration 1984-1989 and 1994-1999 
Methodology review
There are two main empirical approaches to estimate the determinants of inter-provincial or inter-regional migration using aggregate data: the gravity model approach and the polytomous logistic model approach.
Gravity model approach
The basic formulation of this approach is:
The hypothesis is that the gross migration ow from province i to province j, M ij , is directly proportional to the size of the origin and destination provinces' populations, P i and P j respectively, and inversely proportional to the distance between them, D ij . This basic model is usually modied by adding the variables G ij = {X i , X j }, as suggested by either the equilibrium or the disequilibrium approach, or both. These variables are theorized to aect the gravity force, or attraction between the two provinces:
In the modied gravity model, distance is interpreted more generally to encompass not only geographical distance but also any variables that inuence the cost of migration between the two provinces, such as migrant's network . Empirically, (6) is often estimated in double-log form, by taking the logarithms of both sides and adding a multiplicative error term and a constant term:
In many cases (e.g., Fields 1982), migration ows are rst normalized by dividing (6) by origin population, P i , before taking logarithms. This yields the following alternative specication:
where m ij = M ij /P i is the migration rate.
There are two ways in which origin and destination characteristics can enter the estimation equation. In symmetric models, the independent variables are the dierence or ratio of the origin and destination characteristics. Such models assume that the impact of these origin and destina-tion characteristics are equal but of opposite signs. The asymmetric models, on the other hand, take origin and destination characteristics as separate explanatory variables, thus allowing the impacts of origin and destination conditions to be dierent from one another. Not surprisingly, asymmetric models are often the preferred choice, because it is a more generalized model; the possibility of symmetric impact can be tested as restrictions on the estimated parameters of asymmetric models.
Logit model approach
The gravity model and its double log form have been the more popular approach in the literature, probably because it yields good ts, and because the coecients are elasticities and hence easy to interpret. However, Schultz (1977) argues that the gravity model does not recognize that the migration decision is inherently a choice between a nite number of mutually exclusive discrete alternatives, including non-migration. Moreover, in the gravity model, more non-migration will appear to exist for regions that are larger in population and land size simply because a large share of all the moves will occur within boundaries of the large regions. This causes non-migration to be spuriously correlated with origin population size and land area. He then proposes a polytomous logistic model 6 :
As above, m ij is the gross migration rate, and also the probability that an individual locating in province i decides to move to province j. i = j means that a person decides not to move, or only move within the origin's boundary. Z ij is a function of a set of origin and destination conditions (including both G ij = {X i , X j } and D ij ) that aect the migration decision. Schultz provided several possible specications for Z ij , but only one is presented here:
Maximum likelihood can be used to estimate (9) and (10) . Further extension to the model can be made to take into account of the complications that might arise with non-migration (namely the occurrence of m ii ) and to allow for the asymmetric impact of origin and destination characteristics. This is done by viewing the decision process as a two-stage decision process: rst the potential migrant decides whether to migrate, then he chooses where to migrate. This might be interpreted as the distinction between the response parameters for the case i = j and those for the case i = j. That is, when i = j: 6 Like other logit models, the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition (i.e., the odds ratio of any two probabilities is independent of the characteristics of other locations) is required.
where the asterisks mean that the coecient values dier from those in (11) . Taking the logarithms of the odd ratios, one obtain the estimated model:
. OLS can be used to estimate (12) , in addition to maximum likelihood logit.
Comparing (12) with (8), the dierence is that in the logit model the dependent variable is the relative migration rate, while in the gravity model it is the absolute migration rate.
As the interval of time over which migration is measured diminishes, m ii approaches unity, and ln(m ij /m ii ) approaches ln(m ij ), so that (12) and (8) become equivalent. In applying the model to Venezuelan census data, Schultz found that the maximum likelihood logit estimator outperforms the logit OLS, which outperforms the gravity model in its predictive power .
Empirical strategy
The empirical exercise in this section employs the extended gravity model approach, using the model developed in section ?? as its theoretical foundation. Both the gravity OLS model and the logit model are estimated. As will be seen shortly, there are hardly any dierences in the coecient estimates, although these estimates are to be interpreted dierently in the two models.
For the most part, we will focus on the results from the gravity model for ease of interpretation.
From (2), the system of structural equations to be estimated is:
ln(m Equation (13) includes only pre-determined variables, so ordinary least square (OLS) provides a consistent estimator. Equation (14) includes pre-determined variables plus the past migration rate, which is endogenous in (13) . If the assumption that 84 sr and 94 sr are uncorrelated is imposed, the system becomes fully recursive; then OLS applied to each structural equation will yield unbiased and consistent estimates of the direct eects of the covariates on migration in both periods. The indirect eect of a change in a time-invariant predetermined variable, for example distance, on the left-hand-side through the endogenous right-hand-side variable (past migration)
can be computed from these estimates by β 94 d * β m . The total eects, or the sum of direct and indirect eects, can be computed as follows:
However, there may be unobserved factors that aect migration ows in both periods, causing 84 sr and 94 sr to be correlated, and OLS would yield inecient estimates of (13) and inconsistent estimates of (14) . In this case, a system estimator such as three-stage least squares (3SLS) is needed for both consistency and eciency. In the empirical work below, we implement both OLS and 3SLS. But as will be seen shortly, the two estimation methods do not yield qualitatively dierent results.
Throughout the empirical analysis, we will run the above regressions rst on the full sample, then on a sub-sample in which the only receiving provinces included are HCMC and its three neighboring provinces (Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Dong Nai, and Binh Duong). As mentioned earlier, this is a special urban cluster where most manufacturing capital and foreign direct investment are located, and where most of recent growth, especially export-oriented manufacturing growth, is concentrated. As a result, it is of particular interest to examine the determinants and consequences of migration ows into these provinces. Migration data come from the 1989 and 1999 Population and Housing Censuses, also conducted by the GSO. The censuses cover the entire nation, and gather information on demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the population. In particular, they ask questions on place of birth, duration of residence, place of last residence, and place of residence at a xed prior date. A respondent is identied as a migrant if he/she was at least ve years of age at the time of census, and changed place of residence within the past ve years. This allows estimation of inter-and intra-provincial migration ows during the prior ve-year period. As noted, a major drawback of the approach is that it excludes temporary/seasonal and return migrants, as well as those who were born during the ve-year interval. Besides, the exact timing of any reported move is unknown. Thus the census data must underestimate actual migration, and are more likely to reect permanent than temporary moves. Lastly, since we do not have data on provincial per capita incomes in 1984, per capita industrial output in 1986 is used instead.
Data
[ Table 1 [ Table 2 about here]
Such migration patterns accord with theoretical predictions that people tend to move from low income to high income areas, and also from land-scarce to land-abundant regions. The former is borne out by gure 3, which shows a strong and statistically signicant relationship between per capita income and net in-migration, conrming that internal migration in Vietnam is motivated to a large extent by income dierences. However a particular case against this trend is the low level of labor mobility either into or out of the North West region the poorest and also most remote region of Vietnam. The persistence of poverty in this region might be attributable to a combination of high migration costs and household-level liquidity constraints (i.e., inability to nance migration cost due to low income). These in turn are correlated with ethnicity; the more remote regions are also those with the highest proportion of ethnic minorities, whose language and cultural barriers drive migration costs especially high.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Results
Tables 3a through 3c give the estimates for equations 13 and 14 with regional xed eects, using OLS, logit, and 3SLS estimation, respectively. For the 1990s OLS regression, both total and indirect eects of OLS and logit regressions are also shown. As can be seen, OLS and logit models hardly yield any dierences in the results. There are also no major qualitative dierences between OLS and 3SLS estimates, suggesting that any endogeneity caused by correlation of the error terms does not have serious eects on the estimates. This may be because regional dummies already capture much of the unobserved inuence on migration ows in both periods. So to save space, we will discuss only the OLS estimates in table 3a.
[ Tables 3a, 3b , and 3c about here] Table 3a shows that all explanatory variables have coecients of expected signs that are statistically signicant at either 1% or 5% level. Provinces that are further apart send fewer migrants to each other, as the coecient of distance variable is negative. The direct eect of distance in the 1990s is much smaller than in the earlier period. In the 1980s, the distance elasticity of migration is about -1.1, meaning that a 1% increase in distance between province s and province r leads to a 1.1% decrease in migration between s and r, other things equal. In the 1990s, the direct eect of distance has fallen to only 0.437%. This is expected, given that the cost of transportation must have reduced considerably over the decade. After adding the indirect eect, nevertheless, the total eect is approximately the same as in the 1980s.
Provinces with high per capita income attract more migrants. In the 1990s, a 1% increase in the per capita income of receiving province leads to a 1.5% increase in the migration rate, implying a rather high responsiveness of migration to income. By taking the absolute value of the ratio of the estimated distance elasticity to the estimated elasticity on destination income, one can compute the income-distance trade-o, a rough indicator of the cost of moving a given distance further (Greenwood 1997) . That value for the 1990s regression is 0.73 (= |-.1.1/1.5|), meaning that a .73% increase in destination income is needed to oset a 1% increase in distance.
Computed at the sample averages, this means that a move 7km further away can be oset by an increase in monthly income of 11,800 VND (approximately $1.00 at 1999 prices). Although comparisons across studies are hard to make, it is still worth mentioning that such gures for
Canada were found to be in the range of 0.146 to 0.439, with variations across age and education groups and across dierent time periods (Courchene 1970) . For China, the gure is 0.35 (Fan 2005 ). Thus the income-distance trade-o of 0.73% found in this study seems relatively high by comparison with other studies. This suggests that in Vietnam the part of migration cost that is correlated with distance is higher than in other countries.
In the 1980s, the regional dummies show that the major receiving regions were the Central Highlands and the South East, even though per capita income in the Central Highlands was among the lowest in the country during that time. Such ows should thus be interpreted as capturing migration policy eects. Controlling for income dierences, the dummy for urban areas in the 1980s did not show any statistically signicant impact, which is perhaps due to the policy bias against rural-urban migration during this period. In the 1990s, the Central Highlands and the South East continued to be major receiving regions; however, their dummies should no longer be interpreted as measuring policy eects. Rather they should now be interpreted as capturing the impact of structural shocks such as Vietnam's agricultural export boom, especially coee in the Central Highlands. Also, the dummy for urban areas is positive and signicant in the 1990s, indicating the pulling eect of both higher income and rapid manufacturing growth in urban centers. In general, the signs of regional dummies are in accord with the theoretical prediction that the mobile factor (labor) ows to regions with high concentrations of immobile factors (land and capital).
The estimated coecient of per capita income in the sending province is positive. There are two potential explanations for this. First, although past migration and distance control for much of the migration cost, there is no reason to expect that they capture all of it. There are perhaps omitted variables or unobserved province eects that inuence access to information in the sending province, which should reduce the cost of migration and increase migration ows.
Omitting these variables biases the estimated coecient β 94 s upward, since the omitted variables are likely to be positively correlated with per capita income. To partially solve this issue, we estimate equations (13) and (14) with dummies for sending and receiving provinces, to control for some of the omitted variables bias caused by provinces' heterogeneity. Table 3d reveals no major qualitative changes in the results, especially for the 1990s regression.
[ Table 3d about here]
Another explanation for the positive sign of sending province's per capita income is that the liquidity constraint eect might be stronger than the push eect, causing migration ows to be larger when the sending province is richer. We will test this hypothesis in section 3.6.
Alternative specications and models
In the previous section, we follow closely the theoretical framework in section ?? and include only income, distance, past migration rate, and regional/provincial dummies as regressors determining inter-provincial migration. But the migration literature usually includes a number of other provincial/regional characteristics, such as population, unemployment rate, educational levels, per capita land, percentage of ethnic minorities, etc.
7 Furthermore, the theoretical model in section ?? may not be the only model that can explain inter-provincial migration in Vietnam.
It has already been mentioned that migration policies in the 1980s directed migration toward 7 Regional amenities such as average temperatures or number of hot days, etc. are not included because it was explained earlier that for countries with lower income levels such as Vietnam, amenities are less important arguments in the utility function. Consequently, demand for amenities play a smaller role in the migration decisions, whereas wage or income dierentials are thought to be more inuential.
provinces in the Central Highlands region, which had lower per capita income but higher per capita agricultural land. In other words, there might be two distinct migration ows motivated by two dierent reasons. One ow is motivated strongly by income dierential, and perhaps mostly involves rural-urban migration. The other ow is motivated more by per capita land dierential, and probably involves more of rural-rural migration.
In this sub-section, we consider alternative specications by adding other regressors and by repeating the regressions for dierent sub-samples. For regressors whose data are not available, we argue how this might aect our estimates. The goal is to study how robust earlier estimates
are. This will demonstrate how well the proposed theoretical model in section ?? explains reality in competition with other potential models. we will focus on examining alternative specications only for 1990s migration ows, because migration in this decade is more recent and is of higher interest.
The current study does not include unemployment rate as a regressor because these data are not available. Still, we feel reasonably comfortable with excluding this variable for two reasons.
First, a signicant portion of migration in Vietnam are from rural to rural areas which tends to involve the whole family and lead to no occupational change (i.e., the migrants continue to be self-employed farmers in the destination). Second, anecdotal evidence, as well as migration surveys from Guess (1998) reveal that unemployment rates are particularly low among migrants, and that most migrants have jobs arranged before migration or nd jobs within a relatively short time after arrival. This is probably because in Vietnam the job search associated with migration is usually done in the origin before the move, which explains the low unemployment rate among migrants. This rural-based job search strategy is very dierent from an important assumption in the famous Harris-Todaro model, which holds that migrants come to the cities without a prearranged job and with an anticipated employment rate (Harris and Todaro 1970). Other than Guest (1998), there has not been much research to rigorously study the issue of rural-based vs.
urban-based job search for migration in Vietnam. But based on the available evidence, it seems including the unemployment rate will not aect the current estimates much.
Data on the other provincial characteristics are available, and they indeed deserve to be Unfortunately, there is one practical issue regarding the addition of provincial characteristics other than income. As can be seen in table 4, these variables tend to be highly correlated with each other, with income (especially within certain regions), and also with regional dummies. The correlation coecients suggest that the regional dummies might have captured some impact of provincial characteristics other than income, and the addition of these characteristics might cause multi-collinearity problem, making the parameter estimates sensitive to alternative specications.
The multi-collinearity issue is the most serious when we want to test the impact of income dierential vs. the impact of per capita land dierential. The hypothesis is that for rural-rural migration, especially migration into the Central Highlands, per capita land dierential would be more important, while for rural-urban migration, per capita income dierential would be more important. But table 2.4 reveals that for the Central Highlands region and urban areas, all provincial characteristics are highly correlated with each other, if not indistinguishable in some cases.
[ Table 4 about here]
With these caveats in mind, we try adding these provincial variables in the regression because they are important for policy implications. The estimates are presented in table 5a. In model I, the regression is run with regional xed eects. In model II, these regional xed eects are excluded. The rst important result to note is that parameter estimates of distance, past migration rate, and income are highly robust to the addition of these other provincial characteristics or to the exclusion of regional dummies. This strengthens the results found in the earlier regressions, and we feel condent that income is among the most important and robust factors, if not the most, in explaining inter-provincial migration in Vietnam.
[ Table 5a about here]
The second result to note is that parameter estimates as well as t-statistics of several newly added regressors change considerably from model I to model II. This must be due to the high correlation between regional dummies and provincial characteristics. Acknowledging this observation, let us discuss the results. In both models, sending province's percentage of ethnic minorities has a negative impact on migration rate as expected, again conrming limited labor mobility of ethnic minorities in Vietnam. Receiving province's percentage of ethnic minorities has a positive impact despite their lower per capita income. This might reect the legacy of past migration policy in the 1980s, as well as the pull eect of higher per capita land. Indeed, when we take out the regional dummies (which presumably capture migration policy impact), the coecient of this variable doubles. In model I, upper secondary school enrollment rates have insignicant impact on migration. But in model II, they now have positive signicant impact. This is in accordance with the migration literature which usually nds that migrants tend to be more educated. Finally, in both models per capita agricultural land of sending province has a negative eect on migration, as we would expect, even though it is much larger and more signicant in model I. The coecient of receiving province's per capita land change dramatically from model I to model II. With regional dummies controlled for, it is associated with less migration, while without regional xed eects, it is associated with more migration.
We next run the regressions separately for rural-rural migration and rural-urban migration, and the results are in table 5b (We present the results of regressions without regional dummies only; interestingly, for the sub-samples, there are no major qualitative dierences in the results between including or excluding sending provinces' dummies). Only major dierences between the two regressions are now discussed. Distance has a more negative and more signicant impact on rural-rural migration, reecting the fact that most rural-rural migration involves longer moves, while most rural-urban migration are from the surrounding areas of the urban areas into the urban areas. In both regressions, receiving province's ethnic minority percentages are positive, but their magnitudes dier signicantly, and they are also to be interpreted dierently. Ethnic minority variable for rural-rural migration may proxy for migration policy and higher per capita [ Table 5b about here] Finally, in table 5c, we present the regression estimates when the dependent variable is gross migration ow as opposed to migration rate, and the covariates include origin's and destination's population. This is because population might be proxying for various factors that may inuence migration ows, including labor market conditions. Moreover, as explained in the logit model approach in section 3.1, non-migration might be spuriously correlated with origin population size.
The estimates in table 5c maintain results similar to those in earlier regressions, although the colinearity issue remains unresolved as in table 5a or 5b (1994 population has a high correlation with 1994 per capita income, shown in table 4).
[ Table 5c about here]
In summary, people may be migrating for dierent reasons, and several competing theories can explain inter-provincial migration ows. But the empirical results presented so far indicate that income dierential is among the most important and most robust factors motivating migration, especially for rural-urban migration. This supports the validity of the simple theoretical model in section ??. For rural-rural migration, availability of agricultural land is also important. Ethnic minorities are found to have limited labor mobility, and this trend is especially clear for outmigration. For in-migration, the result is more mixed because of two competing eects: provinces with more ethnic minorities are poorer and so should attract less migrants, but these provinces also have more land and so should attract more migrants. The impact of education on migration is generally positive, although it is not robust to alternative specications.
Testing the liquidity constraint hypothesis
It was shown earlier that per capita income of the sending province can proxy for two opposite forces. It may represent the push (or income dierential) eect, meaning that the poorer a province is, the more people want to migrate; thus β s should have a negative sign in (13) and (14) . But it might also represent the liquidity constraint eect, meaning that the poorer a province is, the lower is the capacity to nance migration costs, in which case β s should have a positive sign. Which eect dominates depends on the income level of sending province itself. At low levels of income, the liquidity constraint eect should dominate. At higher levels, the push eect should dominate.
Methodology:
To test this hypothesis, we need to rst compute the income threshold for each inter-provincial ow from s to r. Remember that it is a function of many variables, such as distance, sending province's income, etc., and so there exists one distinct threshold for each ow/observation. Then, we could run two separate OLS regressions, one for the observations in which each sending province's income is below its province-specic threshold, and another for the observations in which it is above the threshold. Comparing the coecient estimates of these two OLS regressions would provide a test of the liquidity constraint hypothesis. The diculty is that we do not know what the income thresholds are, because we do not have all the variables needed to compute them, nor do we have specic functional form for the computation. Thus a direct test of this hypothesis is not possible.
Still, there are a number of ways to indirectly test the hypothesis. In this chapter, we propose three dierent methods to do so. The rst one is the simplest and based on the intuition that the liquidity constraint eect varies with the level of migration cost, becoming material only when migration cost is material. We therefore break the sample into percentiles of distance and past migration rate (which aect migration costs), then examine how β s varies across the sub-samples.
Since we are concerned about non-linearity in the relationship between income and migration, another way is to add the square and/or cube of log of sending province's per capita income to test for higher-order impacts. However, rather than searching for such renements of the parametric specication, we can also estimate the following semi-parametric model, which is the second where the vector Z sr includes all explanatory variables other than sending province's income. Equation (16) falls into the class of partially linear models, which consist of a linear part, βZ sr , and a non-parametric part, f (.). In this model, no parametric assumption is imposed upon f (.), except that it is a smooth function, while for the rest of the variables the usual parametric assumptions are used. The model thus allows the data to freely determine the shape of the inuence of origin's income on migration 8 .
Finally, the third method is to employ maximum likelihood to estimate the following regimeswitching model with unknown and varying thresholds:
ln(m
where T sr is the vector of variables that determine the unobserved and stochastic income threshold y s . The hypothesis is that β 1 s > 0 and β 2 s < 0. The likelihood function is:
where f (.) is the probability density function of the error terms 1 sr and 2 sr . Assume that 1 sr , 2 sr , and u sr are normally distributed with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix:
We then have (Dickens and Lang 1985) :
The log likelihood function is thus: 
We rst break the sample into ve separate subsamples by quintiles of distance and estimate the 1990s regression separately for each subsample. The results are in table 6a. A Chow test (F=54) rejects the null hypothesis that the coecients of the ve piecewise regressions are equal.
A pattern seems to emerge: the impact of sending province's per capita income at rst increases in both magnitude and statistical signicance as distance becomes greater, then falls at the highest distance quintile. This unexpected pattern at the highest distance quintile might be explained by the fact that there is high mobility among the major urban centers in Vietnam, and the average distance among these urban centers are relatively high, because they are spaced out across the country's long geographical border. Such mobility by the richest urban centers might oset the trend that at highest distance quintile the impact of sending province's income matters more. In brief, these results provide partial evidence that at relatively long distances (but not the longest distances), out-migration is more likely to occur from higher-income provinces.
[ Table 6a about here]
We then break the sample into ve sub-samples by quintiles of past migration rate and again run piecewise regressions (see table 6b ). A Chow test (F=50.6) again rejects the null hypothesis of constant coecients. At lower quintiles of past migration rate (i.e., when migration cost is higher), the coecient on per capita income of the sending province is positive, high, and more statistically signicant. At higher quintiles (i.e., lower migration cost) this coecient becomes less statistically signicant and also decreases in magnitude. This suggests that the liquidity constraint eect is indeed stronger when migration costs are higher.
[ Table 6b about here]
The second test of the liquidity constraint hypothesis involves semi-parametric regressions.
Figures 3a and 3b present semi-parametric estimates for the impact of income in the sending province on migration, as specied in equation (16), using the full sample and using the subsample consisting of just the HCMC cluster as receiving provinces.
9 For the full sample (gure 3a), there seems to be a non-monotonic impact of origin's income on the out-migration rate, but this impact is insignicant (the 95% condence limits cover the zero axis; also, for the test of the null hypothesis that this impact is zero, p = 0.16). For the poorer two-thirds of the provinces, 9 Estimates for the parametric part are qualitatively similar to those in parametric regressions and are available from the authors upon request. the relationship follows that predicted by the liquidity constraint hypothesis: sending province's income's impact on out-migration rate rst increases, then decreases with income. For the richest one third, the impact again increases as income rises, but the condence limits widen, casting doubt on the robustness of the estimated relationship. It is therefore dicult to either reject or accept the liquidity constraint hypothesis. Nevertheless, in gure 3b, in which the only receiving provinces included are HCMC, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Dong Nai, and Binh Duong, the null hypothesis of zero impact of origin's income can be rejected (p-value = 0.012). Furthermore, there is a clearer inverse U-shape relationship, as predicted by the liquidity constraint hypothesis: the impact of origin's income on out-migration rate at rst increases, then decreases with income, once income passes the level of around 137,000 VND (about 12-13 USD) per month (mean monthly per capita income in the sample is 162,000 VND, about 14-15 USD).
[ Figures 3a and 3b about here]
The third and nal test of the liquidity constraint hypothesis involves maximum likelihood estimation of a regime-switching model with unknown and varying thresholds, as specied earlier in this subsection. While the econometric model is straightforward theoretically, its implementation runs into numerous diculties. First, we do not know or have all the variables in the vector of variables T that determine income threshold (the minimum income required to be free of liquidity constraint). We do have two potential candidates, distance and past migration rate, because these variables both aect the migration cost. Second, the model is putting a tremendous demand on the data, because the regression must estimate not only the coecients for the two separate regimes, but also the coecients of the regime-determining equation. Third, given the complicated likelihood function, numerical maximization must be used. A further practical issue associated with numerical maximization is the choice of starting values. We must have a reasonably good initial guess of which regime each observation might fall into, and a reasonably good initial guess of all the parameters given the regime. This is dicult as we do not have any other substitutable models whose estimates can be used as starting values.
Because of these issues, there is no guarantee a priori that the available data will be able to estimate the model. In the context of numerical maximization, this means that there is no guarantee a priori that convergence will be achieved. It turned out to be quite dicult to achieve convergence for the sample used in this chapter. Convergence could not be achieved at all when we tried to include too many regressors in the threshold-determining equation. So we left with no choice but to include them one at a time. The results are given in table 7. For model I in which distance is the threshold-determining variable, we sorted the data in ascending values of the distance variable, divided the sample into two halves, ran OLS on each half of the sample, then used OLS estimates from the two sub-samples as starting parameter values for the two regimes. A similar procedure was carried out for model II in which past migration is the threshold-determining variable, but the data were sorted in ascending values of the past migration 10 .
[ Table 7 about here]
The results in table 7 reveal very minor dierences compared with OLS results in table 3. As expected, distance has a positive impact on the income threshold (model I) while past migration has a negative impact (model II). The coecients of sending province's income below or above threshold turn out to be very consistent for whichever threshold-determining regressor used.
This provides us with some condence in the results, given that the two models are given with dierent starting parameter values. For all provinces whose incomes are below their provincespecic income thresholds, the sending province's income is positively associated with migration.
For provinces above their province-specic income thresholds, we expected the coecient for this variable to be negative, but it turns out to be still positive, even though it is much smaller than that for the below-threshold provinces. We may interpret these result as follows. For the full sample that we have, the liquidity constraint eect might be dominating the push eect everywhere, so the impact of sending province's income is positive everywhere. At the same time, there are still two regimes: for the group of provinces below their income thresholds, this liquidity constraint eect is much stronger than that for the group of provinces above the thresholdsthis in a way is still consistent with the liquidity constraint hypothesis.
These results are to be interpreted with much caution however, for several reasons. The regime-switching regression rests on a critical assumption on the distribution of the error terms: they must be trivariately normally distributed. This assumption is perhaps too strong for most developing country data sets. Furthermore, there were many diculties with achieving convergence, and when the model is fed with wildly dierent starting parameter values, convergence might still be attained but yielding quite dierent estimates. Finally, as said earlier, we are still in the dark about which variables actually determine the income threshold. The two variables used, distance and past migration, are potentially good candidates, but there might be many other omitted variables in the threshold equation. 4 Inter-provincial migration and income inequality 10 We also ran the regressions with sending and province dummies, which yield almost the same result when distance is the threshold-determining variable. But for the case of past migration as the threshold-determining variable, convergence could not be achieved with the addition of these dummies. per capita income of both sending and receiving provinces are very large, and also have very high t-statistics. Migration seems to have a mitigating eect on inter-provincial inequality, but the elasticity of this impact is very small: in model I, a 1% increase in out-migration rate from s to r is associated with a decrease in income dierential of approximately .01%.
[ Table 8 about here]
Given that a specic form for the theoretical relationship in 5 cannot be derived, we also tried non-parametric estimation. The disadvantage is the so-called curse of dimensionality: non-parametric estimation becomes dicult when there is more than one predictor, because the potential approximation error grows very fast with the number of predictors. Accordingly, we regress the change in the relative income inequality on out-migration rate only (as opposed to a full non-parametric version of equation 16): Figure 4 graphs the result. Again, as with the parametric analysis, there is overall a slight negative relationship between migration and relative income inequality. Note, however, that this relationship uctuates widely as out-migration rate changes, which leads us to the next step.
[ Figure 4 about here]
Several robustness checks and regression diagnostics were carried out for model I. In model II, migration is instrumented using the independent variables in the earlier regressions in section 3. [ Table 9 Summing up, both parametric and non-parametric analyses provide evidence of a small impact of migration on income inequality between pairs of provinces. This impact varies widely, depending on the receiving provinces, and appears to be related to industrial structures in those provinces. In particular, a negative impact of migration on income dierential is found on ows going to the export-oriented manufacturing cluster in HCMC and surrounding areas, while a positive impact is found on ows going to urban centers in the North. No statistically signicant impact is found on ows going to the coee-growing Central Highlands, while a small negative impact is found on ows going into the Mekong River Delta where the rice sector agricultural productivity is high. That the impact of migration on income inequality varies by receiving provinces is not a surprising result. It was discussed earlier that there is large variation in the economic characteristics of regions and provinces in Vietnam. As a result, population movements to dierent regions might represent entirely dierent types of migration, which in turn represent entirely dierent livelihood strategies at the household level.
11 In Dak Lak and Lam Dong, where the coee boom occurred, per capita incomes increased dramatically from about 215,000VND/person/month in 1994 to about 400,000VND in 1999 and then dropped back to about 230,000 and 238,000 in 2002, respectively. The increase in income in the 1990s could easily be attributed to the coee boom, while the decrease in early 2000s could be the result of the coee bust at the end of the 1990s.
It is worth re-emphasizing that in our analysis of the impact of migration on income inequality, we do not attempt to study inequality at the household level, nor inequality within each sending or receiving province, nor inequality for Vietnam as a whole. Given the available data and the aggregate level of analysis, we simply examine how changes in the income ratio of pairs of provinces vary with migration ows between them. This sheds light on inequality at the province level, and is meant to be complementary to household-level analysis. 12 
Conclusion
This paper has examined two questions: that of the determinants of inter-provincial migration ows in Vietnam, and that of the impact of these ows on inter-provincial inequality. Regarding the rst question, we nd that migration ows follow patterns predicted by theory: people move from low-income to high-income provinces. There is also evidence of a liquidity constraint eect which leads to poverty-related labor immobility at the provincial level.
Regarding the second question, some support is found for the income inequality-reducing ef- Everything considered, the evidence conrms that economic growth and internal migration are complements. On the one hand, migrants respond to increases in the marginal productivity of labor in sectors where Vietnam is exploiting its comparative advantage and acquiring new investments; that is, migration fuels growth. On the other hand, regression analysis indicates a robust and negative impact of migration on income inequality for those migration ows going to the largest manufacturing centers. This implies that migration helps oset some of the increase in spatial inequality caused by location-and sector-specic growth. At the same time, however, impediments to migration, such as liquidity constraints due to low incomes and imperfect capital markets, may imply persistence of poverty for populations in disadvantaged locations. Such evidence suggests that policies facilitating internal migration will be good both for economic growth and inequality reduction. It is important to note, however, that such policies must ensure broad-based access to migration across households and regions, so as to avoid increasing 12 A recent addition to this literature is Hoang et al (forthcoming), who nd that internal migration is pro-poor but also increases inequality within the sending region. inequality within the sending areas.
The most serious constraint to the type of analysis employed in this paper is the restriction posed by aggregate data. Such data fail to account for dierent types of move, and specically, do not do a good job of capturing return and circular migration. With these data, moreover, we observe only average characteristics and trends at provincial level; dierences across individuals or among subgroups of the population are not taken into account in evaluating the decision to migrate. Finally, the gross migration rate msr for aggregates is an unbiased estimator for the underlying individual probability of migrating from s to r only if the characteristics aecting migration decisions are identically and independently distributed across households/individuals, such that behavior of a representative agent mimics that of the aggregate. This assumption is likely to be violated; conclusions on individual migration behavior using aggregate data should thus be drawn with care. The advantage of using these data, for all their limitations, is that they alone are nationally representative at a provincial scale. By gathering migration, employment and remittance data for nationally representative samples of households and individuals, future rounds of the national living standards survey could open the door to considerably richer modes of analysis.
